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G E ND ER E QU A L I TY , FA M I LY LAW A ND A C C E SS TO J U STI CE
suggests that these issues need to be examined in light of basic principles about legal aid funding: the reality of 'neutrality' in gender-neutral categories of entitlement; the 'public/ private' dichotomy created by well-funded legal aid services for criminal law matters ('public') and inadequate funding for family law matters ('private'); and the impact of constitutional guarantees of equality in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As well, the paper suggests a need for 'revisioning' access to justice which promotes gender equality. While the paper focuses on recent issues in Canada, it illustrates approaches to problems of gender and access to justice which are international, particularly in the context of down-turns in national and international economies.
I N TR O D U CTI O N
The low status of family law pervades all facets of our justice system and is reflected in a lack of public resources devoted to resolving conflicts in this critical area. This low status is rooted in the gender-related approach of our legal system . . . Flowing from the gender bias in our justice system is the devaluation of family matters as being essentially private and therefore outside the realm of the 'real law'.
1
These assertions about gender inequality in family law matters were made in a 1993 report sponsored by the Canadian Bar Association. The main focus of the CBA report was an assessment of gender equality in the legal profession in Canada, with recommendations for 'fundamental change'. 2 The report reviewed the problem of gender inequality in the legal profession in a variety of contexts: law schools and bar admission programmes; private practice firms, government legal departments and corporate settings; courts and tribunals; and law societies and the Canadian Bar Association itself. 3 Having identified the nature and scale of the problems of gender inequality, the report set out a framework for understanding equality and discrimination in Canadian law 4 and the factors which should motivate the legal profession to change. According to the report, change is mandated because:
-gender equality is a fundamental legal norm;
-gender equality is a matter of ethics and justice;
-gender equality in the legal profession represents enlightened selfinterest and accountability within a self-regulating profession; and -gender equality for lawyers is in the public interest. 5 Significantly, in the context of this report devoted to gender equality in the legal profession, the Task Force devoted a full chapter to assessing the practice of family law in Canada as 'a case study ' . 6 Commenting on the number of submissions received from judges, law teachers and practitioners (both in private practice firms and in government)
expressing concerns about the practice of family law, the Task Force report explained that its review of family law also permitted an assessment of the degree to which the justice system 'reflected the priorities and values of Canadian society'. Thus, the report noted the oft expressed commitments of federal and provincial governments in Canada sup-porting family life, legislative enactments designed to protect family members, and legal aid schemes created to ensure access to justice in family matters. For the Task Force, the case study of family law was an opportunity to ask searching questions about the reality of these commitments:
Are these endeavours backed up by practical commitments? Are the lofty phrases of our legislators reflected in the concrete experiences of our family lawyers and litigants? In reviewing the evidence about the practice of family law in Canada, the Task Force found that the reality fell far short of our aspirations and our ideals. Lawyers struggling to provide justice to litigants in this area received little support despite verbal assurances from many levels of government. In the cynical words of one female lawyer, governments provide 'all possible aid short of actual help'.
7
Thus, according to the Task Force report, the family law context and the situation of female lawyers in this area of practice represented 'a good case study of the impact of gender inequality on the justice system'.
8
The report's case study on family law identified a number of features which contribute to the disparity between law's stated commitments to family matters and the reality of family law in practice. Central to the problem, according to the report, is the lack of resources available in family law matters. This scarcity of resources is evident in the shortage of vital financial and judicial resources in the justice system for family law dispute resolution, as well as in the absence of sufficient legal aid resources for family law clients. As well, the relatively low status accorded to the practice of family law limits the career options of family lawyers, a disproportionate number of whom are women lawyers in Canada.
In this way, the report suggests that the gender inequality of women in the legal profession intersects with the gender inequity of the justice system in family law; although women who practise as family lawyers may be relatively better-paid than their female clients, their circumstances are, relative to men who are lawyers, frequently The best-known of these disputes involved the decision of a student legal aid clinic at the University of Ottawa to provide legal assistance to women who had experienced violence from family partners, and to deny service to alleged male batterers in cases of domestic violence.
As Jennie Abell has argued, the controversy about this decision raised significant philosophical and political issues about equality in the legal process, although the form of the debate which resulted from the clinic's decision generally failed to address them, focusing instead on issues about decision-making powers within the profession and on process and procedures. 21 Although some of the 'facts' of the dispute remain hotly contested, it seems clear that there was an agreement in principle that the clinic would not simply turn away male batterers seeking legal advice and representation; instead, the clinic seems to have intended to refer such applicants to the local legal aid programme for assistance, and it is at least arguable that they would have received representation from lawyers on the basis of legal aid certificates, or at the very least duty counsel services.
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Whether or not the clinic's referral policy was ever fully delineated or effectively implemented, however, the local Bar (and especially members of the criminal defence Bar) immediately expressed outrage about the decision, calling for the suspension of governmental funding of the student legal aid clinic and then laying a formal complaint, based on sex discrimination, with Ontario's Law Society in 1990. 23 Eventually, a formal hearing was conducted and various efforts to achieve compromise through negotiation occurred, although the issue has continued to resurface in other contexts.
Especially for the Law Society, these issues of gender and legal aid services remain controversial, and proposals to establish specialized legal aid services for women continue to meet criticisms based on sex discrimination. Thus, in the fall of 1993, the Law Society rejected a governmental proposal to establish a women-only family law clinic, once again on the basis that it would be 'discriminatory'. According to press reports of the decision, the Law Society objected to the creation of such a clinic on the grounds that no case had been established showing that a clinic 'offering these broad services is driven by an access need peculiar to women'. 24 Such comments suggest that the issue about women's access to legal aid services in family law, especially in cases of Thus, these continuing challenges to the development of legal aid services expressly designed to meet women' s needs in family matters raise important and controversial issues about the meaning of gender · equality in the Canadian legal aid system. Moreover, while the recommendations of the CBA report affirm the need for action in relation to more comprehensive legal aid services in family law, these recent controversies about legal aid services for women clearly demonstrate that fundamental issues remain contested among members of the legal profession. Since these issues also continue to impede reform efforts designed to respond more effectively to the needs of women claimants for legal aid services in family law matters, a more fundamental assessment of gender equality and access to justice in the family law context is needed.
As Deborah Rhode has suggested in relation to issues of justice and gender in the United States, 'significant progress toward gender equality will require . . . substantial changes in our legal paradigms and social priorities' . 30 Similarly, in thinking about the issue of legal aid services for women in family law cases in Canada, it is necessary to rethink some fundamental principles, both about legal aid services and about gender equality in the family law context. This paper explores some of these more fundamental principles by challenging the 'neutrality' of current categories of entitlement to legal aid services and by demonstrating how they replicate the public/private dichotomy so frequently used to deny legal equality to women. As well, the paper focuses on equality jurisprudence in Canada, especially in relation to gender issues, and raises questions about its potential for challenging current arrangements for legal aid services. In doing so, the paper also envisages the need to transform law and legal processes so as to 'what is is as "biased" as that which challenges it'. 37 Such an assertion is similarly reflected in Richard Abel's conclusion that serious scholarship about legal aid services must take account of its 'inherently political nature'. 38 Thus, in the context of women's greater relative poverty, 'neutral' categories of entitlement to legal aid services must be 
C. Equality
North American jurisprudence about entrenched constitutional guarantees of sex equality have been dominated until recently by ideas of sameness and difference in relation to men and women.
According to some American theorists, women's claims to enjoy benefits and advantages traditionally enjoyed by men depend on assertions that women are similarly situated to men (at least in all relevant respects). 44 By contrast, others have asserted that equality claims must take account of differences between women and men, differences such as those associated with reproduction (and perhaps some aspects of family roles) which mandate differing needs for women, by contrast with men. 45 Yet, as has been noted, the problem of an approach to equality which focuses on either sameness or difference is that they both reinforce men as the standard to which women are compared. Thus, whether women are regarded as the same as men, or different from them, the standard of comparison is gendered. Thus, both the Andrews decision and others relating to sex equality guarantees mandate legal aid services for men and women without discrimination. In this way, legal aid programmes must be assessed, not in terms of the gender-neutral language they use to describe entitlement to legal aid services, but in relation to the substantive outcome of the application of their criteria. Thus, the gender equality objectives of legal aid programmes must be tested in terms of outcomes and results, not just aspirations.
R E-V ISI O N I N G A C C ESS T O J USTICE FO R W O M E N
Effective strategies for gender equality require a re-assessment of ends as well as means. The paradigmatic liberal prescription equal opportunity is a necessary but never sufficient social objective. The ultimate goal is not simply to ensure women's full participation in organizations that wield social, economic, and political power; it is rather to change the nature of those organizations and the way power is distributed and exercised. Our priority should be to empower women as well as men to reshape the institutions that are shaping them. At issue is not simply equality between the sexes, but the quality of life for both of them. 50 Rhode's assertion captures the difference between an analysis of gender equality in our current legal aid arrangements and visions of access to justice which promote substantive equality for men and women in the legal process. In her view, for example, such re-assessment means that concerns about individual intent in legal analysis should be replaced by a focus on institutional practices in relation to discrimination; thus, she has suggested that 'the law's approach to rape, sexual harassment and domestic violence must reach beyond the relatively rare circumstances in which an individual plaintiff comes forward with conclusive proof of injury' to one which focuses 'more critically on the cultural conditions that foster sexual abuse and on the law-enforcement practices that discourage redress'. 51 Such restructuring might need to take seriously the identification of what legal aid services are appropriate for the victims of family violence (more often women and children) and how services should be organized to be most effective in meeting their needs. Thus, focusing our attention on legal aid services as an institutional resource for achieving equality, we may need to rethink the provision of legal aid services in family law matters, the need for student legal aid clinics which offer services to battered women but not to male batterers, and the appropriateness of a legal aid clinic providing services to women in family law matters. In each case, the real question is the extent to which such services contribute to institutional objectives of substantive equality. Or, as See Task Force report, above n I, at 23. 3 See Task Force report, chs 4-10 and 12-13.
• The report reviewed constitutional and statutory protections against discrimination, and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada interpreting these provisions, along with remedial actions. The report stated bluntly:
'The Task Force accepts as a basic premise that men and women should have an equal opportunity to enter and progress in the profession. It views discrimination on the basis of gender as equally repugnant to discrimination on the basis of race or religion. There is nothing controversial about this assertion. It is the law and must form part of the framework for change in the legal profession.'
(emphasis added)
Task Force report, above n I, at 11-12.
5 Task Force report, above n !,"at 17-19. 6 See Task Force report, above n I, at ch. I I.
7 Task Force report, above n I, at 205. 8 Ibid.
9 See Task Force report, above n I, at 203-8. 10 Task Force report, above n I, at 205. Charter of Rights and Freedoms; according to the Task Force report, the approach in Andrews should be understood as a 'purposive' one, focusing on the redress of disadvantaged groups in society, having regard to the social, political and economic conditions. Thus, the Task Force concluded that 'the conte. xtual approach was the "kiss of death" to the concept of formal equality'.
Task Force report, above n 1, at 13. The conclusion that male clients charged with battering were not being denied legal advice and representation is supported by a letter from Dean Donald McRae, Dean of the law school at the University of Ottawa, to the local newspaper, the Ottawa Citizen, stating that the students' arrangements for providing legal aid services to women victims of violence, but not to male batterers, was consistent with the law of discrimination in Ontario:
'It is difficult to understand the vehement and at times almost hysterical attack made on this policy. Its practical effect is that a very small number of men who in the past might have been represented by students will now be represented by practising lawyers, and a significant number of women who have no alternative legal support will now receive representation. This is not discrimination. There is no denial of the right of any accused to the best possible defence available.
There is no prejudging of the guilt of men charged with assault against women.
Acting on the conviction that violence against women is a serious problem, the Student Legal Aid Society is, in accordance with its mandate and in the best tradition of community legal aid programs in the province, seeking to make provision for a particular group whose needs are not adequately served by the existing system'.
See Abell, above n 21, at fn 14. 36 For an analysis of women and poverty, and the relationship to family law, see Erika
